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Résumé : La description purement génétique de l’embryogenèse a récemment
été mise en question. Un intérêt toujours plus ample est accordé aux effets
des contraintes mécaniques. Afin de comprendre si ces travaux produisent
une authentique intégration de niveaux, cet article propose l’analyse d’une de
ces recherches d’un point de vue transcendantal. C’est-à-dire qu’on se posera
la question du processus constitutif par lequel on décrit un objet biologique.
Cette analyse révèle un processus d’objectivation caractéristique du détermin-
isme génétique qui ne peut pas représenter une intégration de niveaux. Cela
nous conduira à introduire le concept de symétrie épistémologique qui se réfère
à une façon équilibrée d’accéder à l’objet biologique. Enfin, on proposera un
modèle de symétrie épistémologique explicitement dérivé du concept kantien
d’organisme.
Abstract: The purely genetic description of embryogenesis has recently been
challenged. Some papers then pay special attention to the causal effects of
mechanical constraints. In order to understand if they produce a genuine
integration of levels, this paper will analyze one of these researches from a
transcendental point of view. That means, we will consider the constitutive
process through which a biological object is described. This analysis reveals
an objectivation process characteristic of the genetic determinism that cannot
represent a genuine integration. That will lead us to introduce a concept
of epistemological symmetry that refers to a balanced way of accessing the
organism. Finally, we will suggest a model of epistemological symmetry that
explicitly comes from the Kantian concept of organism.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 16 (3), 2012, 177–195.
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Introduction
In this paper we will examine some problems that arise from a standard, de-
terministic, method of objectivation in our understanding of embryogenesis.
Then, we will suggest an alternative procedure of objectivation. In the first
section of this paper, entitled “The molecular version of embryogenesis”, we
will analyze the purely genetic description of embryogenesis, trying to bring
out the non-neutral epistemological framework that underpins it. In fact, this
description comes from the idea that a collection of specific developmental
genes entirely controls the developmental process of living systems [Nüsslein-
Volhard 1997], [Lewis 1997], [Wieschaus 1997]. This theoretical framework has
recently been challenged [Neumann-Held & Rehmann-Sutter 2006]. In partic-
ular, it makes it difficult to explain the interactions between different levels of
organization. Many research papers are now interested in a class of examples,
in which extra-genetic factors seem to have a causal role in development. In a
reductive account, such as the purely molecular one, the genetic level is estab-
lished as the primary and fundamental level of organization. Its explanatory
power explains why it is given a priority in many accounts of the complex
process of embryogenesis. Accordingly, it has to be causally closed, or at least
causally sufficient. That means, it has to encapsulate all the conditions of
interactions that allow embryogenesis. As a matter of fact, if the genetic level
is considered as primary, this forces one to describe other levels as emergent
out of it [Bedau 2003]. Then according to him, a causal action going from an
emergent level to a basic level gives rise to an interpretation problem. The
primary level is taken to be the efficient condition of emergent levels, that are
supposed to come later. Thus, it becomes difficult to understand how an emer-
gent level could affect a level that is supposed to underpin it. This apparently
produces a causal circularity insofar as the condition seems to be conditioned
by its own effect. Such seemingly paradoxical connection between downward
causation and causal circularity, in fact, derives from the ontological interpre-
tation of organizational levels. The causal circularity keeps on looking like a
sort of contradiction as far as one level of organization preserves its ontologi-
cal priority. Accordingly, one can easily figure out that this difficulty will be
defused in a philosophical framework that challenges the ontological view of
organizational levels.
In the field of embryogenesis, some recent research papers [Montell 2008],
[Desprat, Supatto, Pouille et al. 2008], [Lecuit & Le Goff 2007], [Pouille,
Ahmadi, Brunet et al. 2009], [Pouille & Farge 2008], [Farge 2009], [Fernandez-
Sanchez, Serman, Ahmadi et al. 2010] pay special attention to the causal
effects of mechanical constraints of tissues on the genetic level. This kind of
research explicitly introduces the requirement of a new theoretical perspec-
tive that would be able to capture the complexity of living systems. That
is to say a theory, in which the genetic level loses its primary causal role,
making room for integration between levels of organization [Farge 2009]. In
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section 2, entitled “The role of mechanical regulation and the hypothesis of
mechanosensitive gene”, we will analyze one of these researches—those of the
group namedMechanics and Genetics of Embryonic and Tumoral Development
led by Emmanuel Farge at the Marie Curie Institute in Paris—in order to un-
derstand if they indeed manage to allow for an integration of levels in the
framework of their interpretation. This kind of result belongs with some other
recent researches [Montell 2008], [Desprat, Supatto, Pouille et al. 2008], [Lecuit
& Le Goff 2007], [Pouille, Ahmadi, Brunet et al. 2009], [Pouille & Farge 2008],
[Farge 2009], [Fernandez-Sanchez, Serman, Ahmadi et al. 2010] aimed at un-
derstanding the impact of mechanical constraints of tissues on the genetic level
during the development of the embryo. As we will explain, these results espe-
cially show that some mechanical pressures that are produced on the tissues
by morphogenetic transformations have a causal role on the genetic expression
of the embryo [Pouille & Farge 2008], [Pouille, Ahmadi, Brunet et al. 2009].
However, in order to produce an adequate interpretation of level integration, it
is insufficient to give a description of embryogenesis in which effects of the con-
text are just added. The main problem consists in considering and explaining
in a theoretical framework the mutual interactions between levels [Brenner,
Noble, Sejnowski et al. 2001], [Noble 2010]. In the research analyzed here
extra-genetic levels are recognized as responsible for the regular formation of
an organism as well as the genetic one. Even so, as we will show later, the
theoretical framework remains implicitly grounded on the idea that the molec-
ular base, especially DNA, has a causal priority. This hybrid approach does
not produce a real integration of levels of organization. On the contrary, all
instances of integration are reduced to mere additional facts. Furthermore, the
problem of downward causation connected to causal circularity is not overcome
as far as one level of organization preserves its ontological and explanatory pri-
ority [Kim 1999], [Bitbol 2012]. This paper specifically relies on these results
obtained by biologists because of their strong relevance for the aforesaid philo-
sophical questions. Indeed they have the merit of establishing a causal role
of an extra-genetic level on the genetic expression. Nevertheless, their effort
to interpret the role of mechanical meets with the theoretical difficulties that
have been pointed out above.
In order to understand what is the starting point that allows to build
a genuine integration of levels, this paper will develop a reflection from a
transcendental point of view in a Kantian sense. In section 3, entitled “The
constitution of objectivity”, we will briefly explain what objectivation means.
This approach arises from the conviction that thinking and intervening is not
a neutral a way of access to a set of pre-given objects. On the contrary, the
intellectual and experimental instruments of inquiry are constitutive of the
biological object. They belong to the wider class of processes of constitut-
ing objectivity [Bitbol, Kerszberg & Petitot 2009]. This remark will provide
us with some appropriate theoretical tools for analyzing the interpretation of
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[Farge 2009], [Pouille, Ahmadi, Brunet et al. 2009], [Pouille & Farge 2008],
[Fernandez-Sanchez, Serman, Ahmadi et al. 2010]. In particular, we will in-
troduce the distinction between a description by intrinsic properties, and a re-
lational account. In section 4, entitled “Developmental genes and mechanosen-
sitive genes”, we will analyze, by our new tools, the objectivation process of
developmental genes. A crucial point to notice is that developmental genes
have actually been discovered using the differential method of experimental
science. As we will show, the differential method is associated with a certain
view of the nature of objects which is very close to what we called a description
by intrinsic properties. This analysis will allow us to look at the hypothesis of
mechanosensitive genes from the same perspective. In fact, it will be shown
that the interpretation of [Farge 2009], [Pouille, Ahmadi, Brunet et al. 2009],
[Pouille & Farge 2008], [Fernandez-Sanchez, Serman, Ahmadi et al. 2010] is
grounded on the same kind of objectivation process, like the one which is
characteristic of genetic determinism. In section 5, entitled “The functional
specificity”, this process will be made more explicit by using the concept of
functional specificity. We will show that the description of the genetic level is
made by way of causal properties [Mumford & Anjum 2011], [Mumford 1998],
[Von Wright 1974], recognized as functional specificities. Unfortunately, this
kind of description cannot represent an integration of levels. It completely ig-
nores a crucial aspect of objectivation which is the substitution of description
by relations for description by intrinsic properties [Cassirer 2004].
In section 6, entitled “Access to biological phenomena using an epistemo-
logical symmetry”, we will introduce a concept of epistemological symmetry,
in order to open up a relational perspective of integration. Epistemological
symmetry, as we will explain, means a balanced way of accessing the biological
object that does not place its genetic level (ontologically and theoretically) be-
fore any other level of organization. This new scheme has to be explicitly built
on the notion of relation, in order to allow the construction of a theoretical
framework for the integration of levels of organization. Finally, this construc-
tive principle will be derived from the Kantian concept of a living system [Kant
2000], in section 7, entitled“A model of epistemological symmetry for biology:
the Kantian notion of living”. By using these new tools we will re-examine the
interpretation of [Farge 2009], [Pouille, Ahmadi, Brunet et al. 2009], [Pouille
& Farge 2008], [Fernandez-Sanchez, Serman, Ahmadi et al. 2010] from a the-
oretical standpoint, in order to provide an alternative interpretation of levels
of organization.
The aim of this paper is to raise a way of access to the living by reflecting
explicitly on the process by which a biological object is constituted. This is
useful in order to modulate the starting point of any construction of models.
That means that this paper does not directly introduce an interpretation of the
role of mechanical constraints in embryogenesis. Rather, it has the ambition to
go upstream, to the very roots of the elaboration of knowledge, and propose an
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adequate framework of interpretation for any relational account of integration.
This proposed framework is the principle of epistemological symmetry.
1 The molecular version of embryogenesis
The description of living systems always depends on a larger world view and is
conditioned by philosophical presuppositions [Gagliasso 2001]. The molecular
version of embryogenesis also depends on non-neutral epistemological assump-
tions. Among many other such assumptions, the notions of program and
genetic code are especially relevant because they largely influenced the be-
ginning of molecular biology [Longo 2009], [Longo & Tendero 2007]. In fact,
according to a classical molecular interpretation, embryogenesis is described
as a process closely controlled by the expression of specific genes called devel-
opmental genes. The theory of developmental genes entails that genes are not
just involved in the embryogenesis process; they regulate it in a specific way
[Nüsslein-Volhard 1997], [Lewis 1997], [Wieschaus 1997]. This ascribes a pri-
mary and causal role to the genetic level. Any successive stage of development
of embryos is produced by the expression of specific genes. Such a language
refers to the idea that a construction program exists in developmental genes
present in the oocyte [Farge 2009].
This kind of description is remarkably akin to the theory of preforma-
tion, modernized in the fashionable term of coding. Indeed, the genetic level
here allegedly contains the complete information that allows the entire pro-
cess of embryogenesis. This approach is grounded on a particularly dominant
metaphor in classical molecular biology: the idea that DNA is an instruc-
tion program for the organism [Farge 2009], [Keller 2000], [Kupiec & Sonigo
2000], [Paldi 2009], [Pichot 1999], as though it were a virtual copy of pheno-
type. Such a language refers to the idea that a construction program exists in
developmental genes inside the oocyte [Farge 2009].
Now, in recent years, and especially since the complete determination of
chemical base pair sequence of human DNA from a physical and functional
standpoint [Paldi 2009], the purely genetic conception has been challenged.
The hard version of genetic determinism, entailed in classical molecular biol-
ogy, is insufficient to account for the complexity of living systems. This concep-
tion seems to be increasingly corrected through new approaches that include
non-genetic mechanisms for explaining changes of phenotype. Accordingly, re-
search in embryogenesis has shown that some elements other than genes are
causally involved during the development of the embryo. This means that
they are not simply involved in a certain stage of embryogenesis. They play a
specific role supposed to regulate the process.
In short, biology is transforming its object into a systematically integrated
network. This requires new methods, both material and theoretical. It is
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interesting to examine this transition from an epistemological point of view,
in order to understand how the integration of the many levels involved in
embryogenesis can be achieved.
2 The role of mechanical regulation and the
hypothesis of mechanosensitive gene
In this section, we will analyze the biological research mentioned above and
especially its fundamental proposition : the hypothesis of mechanosensitive
genes. That will allow us to understand what kind of objectivation is used at
the level of interpretation implied by this hypothesis.
Gastrulation is an embryonic process that consists in morphogenetic move-
ments. These movements allow the positioning of the germ layer. The re-
searches taken into account here have shown that this kind of movements
produce mechanical pressures that have a feedback effect on the biochemical
level. This means that the morphogenetic movement impacts genetic expres-
sion, and somehow regulates it. This point is very interesting because in any
deterministic account, genetic expression is supposed to be sufficient to regu-
late the morphogenetic movements. In other terms, it is supposed to encap-
sulate all the conditions of interactions that allow morphogenetic movements.
This kind of research show that such framework is no longer acceptable. A
double direction of regulation, bottom up and top down, must therefore be
taken into account and properly interpreted. We will now try to understand
more specifically the special work of [Farge 2009], [Pouille, Ahmadi, Brunet
et al. 2009], [Pouille & Farge 2008], [Fernandez-Sanchez, Serman, Ahmadi et al.
2010]. Then, we will make the interpretation of their results more explicit, in
order to show that, even though this research shows the necessity of a new
framework of thought, it only makes a few preliminary steps towards it.
The process of gastrulation in drosophila embryos starts with two morpho-
genetic movements: the invagination of mesoderm tissue, followed by germ-
band extension. It has been discovered that this mechanical event, activated
on the first phase of gastrulation, also becomes a sort of signal that regulates
the subsequent post-translational events inducing a specific genetic expression.
The mechanical signals trigger the concentration of Myo II (motor protein) in
the apical part of the cells. Because of that concentration, cells are com-
pressed and trigger the invagination of mesoderm. In the drosophila embryo,
the genetic network involved in mesodermal invagination is activated by the
transcription factor Dorsal (maternal factor). Dorsal moves from the nucleus,
starting the invagination process and stimulating the expression of Twist (her-
after twi) and Snail (hereafter sna) genes. Both factors are involved in the
genetic control of cell shape movements that cause the compression necessary
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for mesoderm invagination. The embryos with a mutation in twi do not ex-
hibit the second movement. That happens because the protein Fog, necessary
for a stable distribution of Myo II toward the apical part of the cells, is not
secreted. The embryos with a mutation in sna, also involved in Fog expression,
do not exhibit both morphogenetic movements. Accordingly, Snail and Fog
seem to be together necessary for triggering the second compression move-
ment. In order to test the hypothesis according to which the distribution of
Myo II depends on a mechanical cue, a local deformation was produced in the
embryos with a homozygous mutation in sna by means of a micro-manipulated
needle. The deformation was exerted on the mesodermal tissue exactly two
or three minutes after the end of ventral cellularization, which corresponds
to the beginning of the first compression movement in the wild-type embryo.
Embryos with mutation in sna, as previously explained, do not manifest the
normal mechanical pressure associated with the first morphogenetic compres-
sion phase. The local deformation rescues the mesodermal invagination in 67%
of the cases.
The process described above throws light upon the dependence of the Fog
signal as well as the redistribution of Myo II and cell compression toward the
apical part of the embryo on a mechanical cue. Clearly, the role of mechani-
cal cue is necessary for the correct formation of organs. During gastrulation,
the morphogenetic deformation is precisely what induces the successive ex-
pression of genes involved in regulation of post-translational phases. In the
course of embryogenesis, the constant changes of shape in the embryo fre-
quently create new mechanical compressions that are involved in genetic ac-
tivation. The hypothesis of mechanosensitive gene is introduced in order to
interpret this phenomenon of feedback. Mechanosensitive genes are precisely
those genes whose expression is modulated by a mechanical compression on
tissues [Pouille, Ahmadi, Brunet et al. 2009], [Pouille & Farge 2008], [Farge
2009]. According to this interpretation, such genes are able to interpret mor-
phogenetic deformations as signals. That allows them to understand which
stage of its development the embryo has reached, and, in fact, they are ac-
tivated immediately after the mechanical pressure. This kind of mechanism,
a sort of translation from mechanical signal to biochemical signal, is called
mechanotransduction. In this way, it seems legitimate to say, in the language
of the authors, that mechanical cue constantly reprograms the genetic devel-
opment during embryogenesis [Farge 2009]. In other words, on one hand there
is the DNA, that codes for morphogenesis. On the other hand, there are me-
chanical deformations of tissue that are interpreted, as the authors say, by
DNA as signals of the various developmental stages of the embryo.
This is clearly an attempt to describe embryogenesis by coupling the ge-
netic level with its tissular context through the mechanical issue. Nevertheless,
the theoretical framework does not change. The hypothesis remains grounded
on a causal priority of the genetic level because even the role of mechanical
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deformation is explained by invoking, once again, its possible molecular basis.
In fact, the hypothesis ascribes to genes the property of being receptive to
mechanical pressures in a specific way. This is in order to explain a specific
genetic expression occurring after a morphogenetic movement. Apparently,
the problem of circular causality does not arise in this context. Nevertheless,
as a matter of fact, the problem is just diverted. The causal role of the action
that occurs from tissues to the genetic level is just put aside. In such a way,
the feedback causality is reduced to a specific sensitivity of genes.
The effort to connect both the mechanical and the biochemical aspects,
in order to account for mutual interactions between levels, falls into a theo-
retical difficulty. The problem arises in the process of objectivation used to
identify and describe the biological object. We introduce now, in a general
way, what constitution of objectivity means, in order to render this difficulty
more explicit.
3 The constitution of objectivity
The notion of constituting objectivity explicitly comes from Kant’s theory of
knowledge. This notion arises from the conviction that the objects of science
are not already given out there. The objects have to be elaborated out of
the phenomena that are perceived by the subject, by means of a categorical
framework arising from the understanding of this very same subject [Bitbol
1998, 2000, 2010], [Bitbol, Kerszberg & Petitot 2009]. In other terms, any
scientific object is constituted, and its configuration depends on the concep-
tual instruments used to understand it [Bailly & Longo 2006]. More precisely,
constituting objectivity means unifying the flow of sensory perceptions, by
extracting from it stable regularities and structures that are invariant with
respect to a class of transformations [Bitbol 2000, 188]. It is particularly im-
portant to insist here on what is typical for this process, namely its relational
aspect. As we have just suggested, scientific objects do not already exist in
nature, but are constructed by applying concepts to a variety of representa-
tions. If this is the case, it is incorrect to consider phenomenal invariants as
intrinsic properties of objects, since it is by the location of these very invari-
ants that the scientific object is constructed [Cassirer 2004, 197]. Moreover, a
description in terms of intrinsic properties of scientific objects implies a strong
ontological commitment: believing in a rigid correspondence between objec-
tivity and reality. This implies a level of realism which is difficult to defend
in sciences, especially in quantum physics [Bitbol 1997, 1998]. In fact, it is by
finding stable relations between representations that one configures regulari-
ties and invariants. Therefore, scientific objects should be described in terms
of relations, not of intrinsic properties [Cassirer 2004, 112]. Cassirer explains
this relational conceptualization in a particularly clear manner:
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We do not isolate any abstract part whatever from the manifold
before us, but we create for its members a definite relation by
thinking of them as bound together by an inclusive law. [Cassirer
2004, 20]
It is important to notice that the scientific object so constituted, or conceptu-
alized, is entirely free from ontological characteristics, such as having internal
and permanent properties. In this context, the relevance of the scientific ob-
ject is finally defined by notions of order and position rather than by intrinsic
features. That means that the object is determined by functional relations
throughout [Cassirer 2004].
The principal consequences of the Kantian point of view have been drawn.
Now we are ready to analyze the process of constituting objectivity in a molec-
ular version of embryogenesis. That will clarify the reasons why the hypothesis
of mechanosensitive genes cannot produce an integration of levels, despite its
effort to go beyond a purely genetic vision of embryogenesis.
4 Developmental genes and mechanosensi-
tive genes
From the point of view of genetic determinism, a developmental gene is spe-
cific if its activation is directly related to one or several functions necessary for
another stage of embryogenesis. From this perspective, it is claimed that cer-
tain genes are specific to certain embryogenic functions if the latter are altered
after a mutation produced in a DNA segment [Nüsslein-Volhard 1997], [Lewis
1997], [Wieschaus 1997]. Developmental genes have actually been discovered
using this method, which is usually called the differential method. Now, it is
possible to stand back and look at the epistemic process by which the object
developmental gene is constructed. In this way, it becomes clear that the dif-
ferential method is associated to a certain view of the nature of objects which
is very close to what we called a description by intrinsic properties. Actually,
the biological object developmental gene, is defined by way of reducing it to
its causal properties. In the case of molecular biology, causal properties cor-
respond to functional specificities. After a mutation of a DNA segment, a
change in phenotype such as, say, a lack of morphogenetic movements with
respect to the normal formation of the embryo, is observed. These movements
are specific because they have a precise role in the global embryogenesis pro-
cess. For example, after the mutation of a certain set of genes in drosophila
embryos, a mutation leg has been observed. Instead of animal feet, a pair of an-
tenna grows. The latter set of genes (that are hox genes) has then been called
antennapedia complex ANT-C [Kaufman, Seeger, Olsen et al. 1990], [Lewis,
Wakimoto, Denell et al. 1980]. The specificity of the variation in phenotype
is considered as the proper invariant to extract from this observation. This
186 Nicole Perret
specificity has been isolated from the entire process by the implicit conceptual
act of choice of a reproducible feature. In such a way, the functional specificity
is turned into an intrinsic property. As soon as this kind of conceptual act
is made explicit, something appears about the epistemological nature of bio-
logical levels. We notice that the invariant of specificity is extracted from the
phenotypic level, while it becomes a property of the genetic level. This hap-
pens because the phenotypic level is considered as a process that is continuous
in space-time. By contrast, the genetic level is considered as a collection of
discrete objects. Intuitively, an intrinsic property cannot be easily attributed
to a continuous process such as a movement, but it needs rather a discrete ob-
ject. This is why the specific functional property is transferred to the genetic
level. It is this transfer that generates the constitution of a biological object:
the developmental gene. In other terms, the functional specificity of an event
is isolated. That makes it discrete and crystallizes a certain number of intrinsic
properties that are all linked to its functional specificity. This conceptual act
produces the illusion of ontological existence of an objective level that is not
described as a level of organization, but as a set of real objects: genes.
We have shown the epistemological process by which developmental genes
are constituted. Now it is possible to better discern some theoretical prob-
lems. First of all, the standard descriptions of the biological object tend to
hide their relational constitution, and to rely on ontological discretization. In
other terms, one does not recognize that the object is constituted by the ex-
traction of relational invariant regularities between representations. Instead,
one features it in a substantial manner by attributing it intrinsic properties.
This description of embryogenesis, although leading to metaphysical realism,
does not immediately meet certain technical problems, as long as no one wants
to account for interactions between various levels of organization having a feed-
back effect at the genetic level.
Now, it must be noticed that the hypothesis of mechanosensitive genes is
constructed from the same type of objectivation process as the one which leads
to identifying developmental genes. True, here the direction of the differential
method is opposite because the alteration is produced at the tissular level
instead of the molecular level [Farge 2009]. Nevertheless, in order to account
for the modulation of genetic expression by morphogenetic movements, the
property of mechanosensitivity is attributed to a well-defined set of genes.
Causal properties are once again transferred to the genetic level, and the causal
role of the mechanical pressure remains theoretically uncharted.
5 The functional specificity
The perspective that brought about the hypothesis of mechanosensitive genes
is grounded on the attribution of a functional specificity to the genetic level.
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According to the differential method, a functional specificity is recognized by
way of certain characteristics. A visible change is required. The changing
factor has to be localized. Once localized, the change has to be predictable
[Nüsslein-Volhard 1997]. As documented above, the sensitivity of these devel-
opmental genes clearly has a key role in the formation of organs because, when
it is inhibited, post-translational movements do not occur. This is indeed a
visible change. The change factor can be localized in the relevant genetic ex-
pression, because, if this is inhibited, the effect is lost. Once reproduced, the
change is a predictable effect. These characteristics allowed one to state that
developmental mechanosensitive genes are specific biological objects. These
objects were individualized by their reduction to a functional specificity, and
then turned into an intrinsic property: mechanosensitivity. But now one must
ask what these mechanical pressures are, and what their role is.
The post-translational process preceding good formation of organs does
not depend, at this stage of embryogenesis, only on the fact that certain
genes are mechanosensitive. Mechanical pressures generated by morphogenetic
movements also carry a certain form of specificity. These movements have a
functional role because post-translational movements depend on them. Their
inhibition has a visible effect: the absence of the predicted genetic expression.
The change factor can easily be localized at the precise point where the pres-
sure is realized (or inhibited) and at a precise moment during the embryo’s
development. This effect can be reproduced and predicted. In spite of this, it
seems difficult to consider morphogenetic movements (and the consequential
pressures) as specific biological objects because it is impossible to make them
discrete. The problem also lies in the fact that, as documented above, a dif-
ferent status is ascribed to these two phenomena. On one hand, the genetic
level is considered as a set of biological objects. On the other hand, there is
a mechanical context having rather the characteristics of a process. But then,
using specificity as a tool of objectivation, there is no reason to identify objects
on one side and not on the other side, since both levels involve specificity.
Relating genotypes to phenotypes by the criterion of specificity, which un-
derpins the concept of developmental gene, is quite difficult. In fact, functional
specificity becomes a causal property and this fact produced an illusion of pri-
ority of level. This illusion interferes with a description of a living system as
an integrated network of levels of organization. Nevertheless, even though it is
correct to speak about specificity at the genetic level, it must be kept in mind
that any other level has a form of specificity.
In order to clarify this point, an analogy with the notion of information in
molecular biology can be given. In a classical description of embryogenesis, the
notion of digital information is a criterion that allows prioritizing the genetic
level in a causal sense. That is because the genome is supposed to contain the
complete information of the developmental process. Nonetheless, every mea-
sure that allows to speak about information at the genetic level can actually
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be found in the egg cell too. The egg cell must contain more information than
the genome. This makes the notion of information an inadequate criterion
for attributing priority to a given level [Noble 2006, 2008, 2011]. The same
happens with the criterion of specificity which raises another concern. When
the functional specificity becomes a causal property, this produces not only
an illusion of priority of the genetic level, but it also provides discretization of
continuous processes into collections of distinct objects.
In the hypotheses of mechanosensitive genes the sensitivity to mechanical
pressure is presented as an intrinsic property of some developmental genes.
Once again, a functional specificity is turned into a causal property in order
to maintain the completeness of the genetic level. As shown above, specificity
lies in other levels of organization as well, in this case the tissular context.
Therefore, the criterion of functional specificity used as a narrow objectify-
ing tool actually does not afford an integration of levels. On the contrary,
it maintains a theoretical and arbitrary priority of the genetic level. This
priority is founded on the fact that genes supposedly contain all causal intrin-
sic properties. Nevertheless, causal intrinsic properties come from an implicit
conceptual act of choice of invariants (functional specificities) that have been
isolated from the entire process. In a nutshell, the concept of specificity used
in genetic determinism is ambiguous because it is founded on the hypothesis
of the priority of the genetic level, that is actually imposed by it.
6 Access to biological phenomena using an
epistemological symmetry
As shown above, the method of locating a biological object through its intrinsic
properties raises a set of interconnected problems. First of all, this method is
derived from the concept of functional specificity that is ambiguous because
it imposes its own condition of possibility (the priority of the genetic level),
and grounds it. This involves a metaphysical commitment to an ontological
priority of a certain level: the genetic level. In addition, by using this kind of
conceptual method in order to localize a biological object, it is impossible to
account for any causal role of another level of organization, in this case the
tissular level. This is why the hypothesis of mechanosensitive genes, based on
this kind of process of objectivation, actually denies any theoretical causal role
other than the role of genes. All these difficulties are linked to a more general
confusion that arises from considering causality as a property [Mumford &
Anjum 2011], [Mumford 1998], [Von Wright 1974] existing inside the biological
object, and not as a possible relation between levels of organization. This leads
to legitimate the assumption of causal completeness of the genetic level, and
to ascribe thereby a sort of ontological priority to it, whereas it is precisely
because of this confusion that the genetic level keeps its causal priority.
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In order to overcome these difficulties, one must construct descriptions of
living systems as integrated networks of levels of organization. Accordingly, it
can be useful to find a mode of access to phenomena that does not consider a
level as being ontologically privileged with respect to any other. This balanced
mode of access can be called epistemologically symmetrical. It allows us to look
at embryogenesis, and more generally at living systems, from a more neutral
perspective. A perspective that does not impose directions of dependence
to levels of organization. Most importantly, a perspective where levels of
organization, understood as levels of dynamic relations, do not depend on a
privileged level. A level made of quantifiable and localizable discrete objects.
In doing so, a theoretical equivalence of value can be established between levels
of organization. It is only from this symmetry that we can then determine a
biological object by the relations of order and of position that constitute it.
This corresponds to the Cassirerian substitution of a description by relation
for a description by intrinsic properties [Cassirer 2004].
7 A model of epistemological symmetry for
biology: the Kantian notion of living
According to Kant, “. . . a thing exists as a natural end if it is cause and effect
of itself ” [Kant 2000, 243]. A living organism perfectly fits this condition for
three reasons.
1. The living organism is cause and effect of itself, because it preserves
itself as a species by generating another organism of the same species:
the cause of maintaining the species is then this species itself, which is
its own effect.
2. The living organism grows, but it is not a growth by mechanical laws;
rather it is a process involving self-production. Each organism is then
cause of itself because it develops, but it is also its own effect because it
develops by using a substance that is its own product.
3. Finally, the conservation of an organism depends on the conservation of
its parts, which depends in turn on the conservation of the whole. Parts
are functional in regard to the whole, and the whole has parts.
[Kant 2000, 242–243]
As soon as the logical structure of the teleological judgment has been
extracted, it appears as a remarkable model of an epistemological symmetry
of access to living phenomena. Indeed, it is possible to find in teleological
judgment a relevant tool for constituting objectivity that is both balanced
and specific to the living object. Teleological judgment is an epistemic process
requiring access to the object through its unity (this object being cause and
effect of itself), before giving a discrete description of its parts. This means
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that an identifiable property is not merely a characteristic of a part of an
organism. Instead, any part of the organism considered as a local object only
arises from relational properties. These relational properties are generated
continuously from the global functioning of the system organism which is cause
and effect of itself (in so far as it is self-generative). This approach allows one
to rebuild a mode of access to the living from the very relations of order and
position that constitute it. Therefore, this approach allows one to substitute
a description by relation to a description by intrinsic properties.
It is now possible to come back to the case of mechanosensitivity examined
above. If we use the theoretical instruments of Kant’s Critique of judgment,
it seems legitimate to access embryogenesis directly by its unity. One then
considers a global process of mutual constraints, where no signal communica-
tion is assumed and interpreted by intrinsic properties. Rather, the process
becomes a relation of self-constitution that makes it possible to talk about
levels without granting privilege to any one of them. Indeed, in this case,
levels are not pre-given but define themselves by displaying discrete, local and
partial effects in the continuous process of embryogenesis. In particular, it is
possible to recognize the genetic level only by the effect it has on the tissular
level and morphogenetic movements. In other words, by way of this episte-
mological symmetry it is possible to individualize organization levels without
compromising their reciprocity. This is so because this instrument of access
takes into account the practical procedures that have been used as part of the
process of objectivation. In this way, we understand that the alleged flux of
causation from the biochemical level to morphogenetic movements arises from
the fact that we act experimentally in this direction. This being granted, a
reciprocal action is also possible, and that is proved by the kind of research
analyzed above. Such fundamental results derive from the fact that we do not
need pre-existing properties regulating other properties in the strongest sense
(e.g., when the regulator is considered as primary and cannot therefore be reg-
ulated in turn by its emergent level). On the contrary, we make explicit that
we are constructing a set of characteristics that allow us to interpret the pos-
sibility of interaction between levels. Developmental genes have been brought
out by acting on a certain level of organization. Mechanosensitive genes have
been discovered in the same way, but by acting on another level of organiza-
tion. Interpreting these findings by the usual pictures of intrinsic properties
forces one to reduce all these properties to the biochemical level, even if the
specificity, as shown above, arises from the tissular level. By assuming epis-
temological symmetry, we no longer need to posit intrinsic properties and we
interpret the double regulation as a totally legitimate possibility depending on
our twofold way of access.
As it was shown above, the theoretical framework of genetic determinism
in embryogenesis implies that the genetic level has a causal priority over the
organism. Of course, it comes up against several circularity problems as soon
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as feedback from emergent levels occurs. In the hypothesis of mechanosensi-
tive genes, the problem was overcome by attributing the property of sensitiv-
ity to the relevant developmental genes. That fitted with prior causality at
the genetic level without contradiction. The genetic expression, in fact, was
considered as caused by the property to react to morphogenetic movements
and not by mechanical pressures. Nevertheless, this way of approaching the
regulation of embryogenesis remains incomplete in regard to the role of organ-
ismic context and, moreover, it comes against the problem of specificity and
description by intrinsic properties. By contrast, tackling the regulation of em-
bryogenesis by the method of relational objectivation allows one to overcome
causal circularity, because the notion of level is interpreted in a non-dualistic
framework. Indeed, levels no longer exhibit a substantial distinction nor a
prior distinction between properties and structures. Instead, properties and
structures are identifiable as an outcome of the access to the biological object
as an interacting system. Causality is no longer taken as a property; it be-
comes a constitutive relation of the level under consideration and the problem
of circularity is thereby overcome. In other words, teleological judgment im-
plies a top-down and bottom-up dependency. That means, the level considered
as an effect can also be characterized as a cause of what it is the effect of. This
is possible by shifting the constitutive relation. If we take the second part of
Kant’s definition: “Each organism is then cause of itself because it develops,
but is also its own effect because it develops through a substance that is its
own product”, we realize that it is exactly this aspect that is missing in molec-
ular interpretation of embryogenesis. Genetic level being described as a set of
real discrete objects full of causal property, it can never become an effect. In
fact, it cannot have causes, and this imposes an epistemological asymmetry
unsuitable to the relational circularities in life phenomena.
Conclusion
The requirement to overcome genetic determinism in embryogenesis produced
a considerable amount of research papers. The aim of this paper is to include
non-purely genetic determinants in the process of the embryo’s development.
This paper closely studied research about the effect of tissular mechanical
constraints on the genetic control of development. This was done in order
to understand how an integration of levels was produced. The problem was
set in a transcendental framework, asking questions about the nature of the
objectivation process implied in the concept of genetic determinism. A critical
observation has enlightened difficulties linked to a description of the living ob-
ject by intrinsic properties (notably a metaphysical commitment of existence
of a privileged level), as well as an ambiguity of the functional specificity cri-
terion, and a problem of causal circularity. In such a way it was shown that
alternative hypotheses remain often linked to deep presuppositions about the
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way an object should be construed. That happens, despite the fact they try
to overcome the causal hegemony attributed to the genetic level by genetic
determinism. In this paper, we suggested accessing the organism by way of
an epistemologically symmetrical approach of biological objects, an approach
based on a theoretical equality of epistemological value of any level of orga-
nization. We then found a model of this epistemological symmetry in Kant’s
notion of the living. This allowed us to identify a mode of constitution of
objectivity in which the definition of levels, as well as of causal directions, is
subordinate to the practical procedures that have been used. The problem
of causal circularity was thus approached in a completely non-dualistic way,
without any ontological commitment in favour of the priority of a level of orga-
nization on another. By introducing the principle of epistemological symmetry,
this paper proposed a new interpretation of relational accounts of inter-level
integration.
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